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PAOLO SARTORI
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
AS A COLONIAL REFORM
The Qadis and Biys in Tashkent, 1868-18831
The expansion of the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century was followed by the
incorporation of new bodies of law into the state judicial system. Instead of imposing
Russian legal institutions, state policy was to support a pluralistic legal regime (“a
cheap way to keep the peace — in return for tribute and taxes”).2 As the Empire
extended its boundaries and moved into new territories, gaining control over their
resources, Russian lawmakers and administrators had to impose governance and
secure social order in the regions being incorporated into the state system. Thus,
encompassing local bodies of law into the Imperial governance, as well as
recognizing rights and obligations in accordance with indigenous customs and laws
were seen as necessary tools for implementing Imperial policies of colonization. 
There is no reason to doubt that the establishment of Russian rule in Central Asia
was shaped by this policy. When lawmakers discussed the first draft of the
enactment designed for governing Turkestan, they were concerned that the new
province would be a burden on the Imperial treasury.3 In addition they felt that
allowing the indigenous inhabitants to continue to exercise some control over legal
1. This study was done as part of the research project “Islamic Law in Central Asia Under
Tsarist and Early Soviet Rule: Tashkent Qadi-Courts from 1865 to 1928” funded by the
Volkswagen Stiftung. I would like to thank Ulfatbek Abdurasulov, Hamidulla Aminov,
Ghulom Karimov and Shovosil Ziyodov for their valuable assistance during this research. I am
also grateful to Wolfgang Holzwarth, Alexander Morrison, Jürgen Paul, and two anonymous
referees for Cahiers du Monde russe for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.
2. Jane Burbank, “An Imperial Rights Regime. Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire,”
Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 7, 3 (2006): 402.
3. “Po povodu mestnoi administratsii Turkestanskoi oblasti,” Turkestanskii sbornik, tom VI,
sostavliaemyi V.I. Mezhovym (SPb., 1860), 275.
80 PAOLO SARTORI
proceedings and also exercise the right to appeal to Imperial courts would be a good
way to spread the Russian understanding of civil society (grazhdanstvennost´)
among the local population.4
From the legislators’ point of view, the incorporation of local systems of law
was formalized in accordance with the idea of reform. Indeed, “reforms” was the
key word used by Russian officers and administrators when they drew up
regulations to make the exercise of indigenous law more efficient and see to it that
the legal practice of local communities complied with Imperial standards.5 
Recent scholarship has not disregarded the importance of these issues, but
attention focused on colonial regulations while the legal features and the limits of
the “reforming” policy on the Central Asian judicature went largely unquestioned.6
Therefore, what these “reforms” consisted of and the results that ensued from them
are questions which still await systematic investigation.
From the following discussion it will be clear that Russians succeeded in
reforming only the office of judge of Islamic and customary law (respectively
sharī‘at- and ‘ādat-based) courts. Thus, if we want to assess the effect of tsarist
colonial policy on the field of law in Turkestan, we should look primarily at the
impact the reform had on the career of the indigenous judiciary. For this purpose, this
paper will focus on elections for the offices of qadi7 and biy. In this respect, colonial
Tashkent is an ideal environment on which to concentrate our investigation: it had a
large number of native judges as there were four sharī‘at-based courts and one that
was ‘ādat-based. Moreover, it was the capital city of the general governorship, thus
expected by its Russian administrators to serve as an example of the good effects of
their policies of colonization.8 As for the time span this study should cover, we have
decided to examine some micro-stories between the years 1867 and 1883. This period
roughly corresponds with the implementation of the 1867 Provisional Statute,9 the
4. Ibid., 277.
5. N. Frideriks, “Turkestan i ego reformy,” Vestnik Evropy, 6 (1869): 691-712. 
6. To the best of our knowledge, the issue of judicial reform in Central Asia has been studied only
by Ol´ga I. Brusina, “Obychnoe pravo kochevogo naseleniia Turkestana v sisteme rossiiskogo
upravleniia,” in Sergei N. Abashin and Vladimir I. Bushkov, eds., Sredneaziatskii sbornik, 5,
(2006): 217-234. A German translation is also available as “Die Transformation der Adat-Gerichte
bei den Nomaden Turkestans in der zweiten Hälften des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Michael Kemper and
Maurus Reinkowski, eds., Rechtspluralismus in der Islamischen Welt, (Berlin and New York: De
Gruyter, 2005), 227-253. This article was reviewed by Virginia Martin, but disappointingly the
theme of judicial reform was not directly discussed, cf. Central Eurasian Reader, 1 (2008): 240-
241. In another work, Law and Custom in the Steppe. The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and
Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century (Surrey UK: Curzon, 2001), 50-51, Martin does
mention judicial reforms in Russian Turkestan but without investigating them in depth.
7. In the original Arabic-script sources, the word is spelled as qāzī.
8. Proekt vsepoddanneishago otcheta Gen. Ad´´iutanta N.P. fon-Kaufmana po grazhdanskomu
upravleniiu i ustroistvu v oblastyakh turkestan general-gubernatorstva (SPb.: Voennaia
Tipografiia, 1885), 50. 
9. “Proekt polozheniia ob upravlenii semirechenskoi i syr-dar´inskoi oblastei,” in Materialy po
istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana (so vremeni prisoedineniia Kazakhstana k Rossii do
velikoi oktiabr´skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii), t. 1 (Alma-Ata: Izdatel´stvo Akademii nauk
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moment when local communities were first confronted with the enforcement of the
new regulations concerning the judiciary. From this perspective, exploring this period
will allow us to trace the way indigenous groups initially coped with the new rules.
The Scope of “Reform”
Colonial “reforms” involved the local judicature mainly at a macro-level: the
enactment introduced by the Russian government in Turkestan in 1867 changed the
procedure for selecting court officials as the statute granted local communities the
right to elect their own judges. In addition, sharī‘at- and ‘ādat-based courts were
deprived of authority over criminal law and could hear only a limited number of
cases.10 Russians also intervened in the way justice was to be administered:
punishments were commuted into sanctions and brought into line with Imperial
law, thus forbidding the death penalty and stoning.11
Conversely, legal practice — the micro-level of the judicature — was almost
completely disregarded by the Russians and thus left outside of the realm of the
“reforms.” This does not come as a surprise as the basic approach to reforming the
local judicial systems was fully congruous with the oft-quoted strategy of non-
interference (ignorirovanie) designed by the first governor-general, von Kaufman.
The arguments usually given to explain this policy are twofold: on the one hand, at
the beginning of their colonial enterprise, the Russians had a cautious approach
towards Islam and Muslim customs, as they did not want to stir up local feelings of
discontent. On the other hand, the newcomers claimed that in the long run
introducing new legal practices and integrating them with existing ones would
compel the indigenous population to lose respect for local courts and choose the
more civilized Imperial tribunals.12
However, the Russians’ reluctance to interfere with existing legal practice
should not only be interpreted as a result of the interaction of cautiousness and
civilizing superiority.13 What should instead be emphasized are the principles
which guided the way colonial enactments on matters regarding the legal sphere
10. On this point see Martin, op. cit., 92. However, it should be noted that qadis continued to
hear cases of robbery even if these were formally under the jurisdiction of the Imperial
judiciary. Cf., for example, the following files in the Sībzār qadi-court register for the year
1899: TsGARUz (Tsentral´nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan — Central
State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan), f. I-365, op. 1, d. 74, l. 45, 77, 83, 117, 149, 155. 
11. Martin, op. cit., 52-53.
12. G. Zagriazhskii, “O narodnom sude u kochevago naseleniia Turkestanskago kraia, po
obychnomu pravu (zan),” in Materialy dlia statistiki Turkestanskago kraia. Ezhegodnik pod
redaktsiei N.A. Maeva, vypusk IV (SPb., 1876), 191; I.I. Kraft, Sudebnaia chast´ v
Turkestanskom krae i v stepnykh oblastiakh (Orenburg: tipo litografiia N.N. Zharilova, 1898),
92. 
13. On this last point see the valuable observations of Martin, op. cit., 48.
Kazakhskoi SSR, 1969). When referring to entries of the Provisional Statute, we will use the
symbol §.
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were drawn up. The basic guidelines for the reorganization of the judiciary in
Central Asia under the umbrella of Russian rule are to be found in the judicial
reform signed by Alexander II in 1864, which called for avoiding arbitrariness, thus
allowing oral argumentations and the holding of public trials. But what Russian
administrators sought to introduce immediately in the Central Asian legal
environment was the idea that judges should be independent, thus be elected by
their peers.14 
There is a further reason why colonial interference with the indigenous legal
systems was restricted to the macro-level. When the colonial government was
established in the region, Imperial legal ethnography had already been developed
and descriptions of court proceedings had been collected in articles and books.15
However, the cumulative experience of Imperial administrators, ethnographers,
and statisticians gathered in these publications was of little value to Russian
lawmakers in terms of administrative and legal usefulness. In fact, besides a large
number of articles of an introductory nature, administrators, scholars, and statistical
committees had compiled codes, or else collected and described legal cases
following a custom already well established in the Northern Caucasus.16 However,
for the colonial officers asked to assess the soundness of the legal practice of
sharī‘at- and ‘ādat-based courts this accumulation of knowledge was of little use.
Referring to either a code or to a collection of cases, it is unlikely that without
proper legal training, Russian officers would sit in on biy-court hearings or interfere
directly with legal proceedings.17 Moreover, even if they were able to understand
the court hearings — as some administrators in the late period of tsarist rule most
probably were — it did not imply that colonial officers could influence qadis’ and
biys’ legal understanding, nor change the way they resorted to traditional legal
mechanisms or issued legal certificates.18 This is why, with the sole exception of
the attempt made by Count Pahlen at the beginning of the twentieth century, the
14. All these points have been carefully studied by Jörg Baberowski, “Law, the Judicial
System, and the Legal Profession,” The Cambridge History of Russia. Vol. 2, Imperial Russia,
1689-1917, Dominic Lieven, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 344-368.
15. To date, the most comprehensive list of such publications was compiled by Virginia Martin,
op. cit., 164-165, notes 9-13. The argument on the importance of cumulative colonial
knowledge of the local judicature, however, holds true only for biy-courts, but not for those
presided over by qadis’, as studies on Islamic law in Central Asia appeared rather late, only
after 1892.
16. Michal Kemper, “‘Adat Against Shari‘a: Russian Approaches towards Daghestani
‘Customary Law’ in the 19th Century,” in Bairam Balci and Raoul Motika, eds., Religion et
Politique dans le Caucase Post-Soviétique, (P.: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2007), 74-95.
17. This point was first set out in Kirgizskaia stepnaia gazeta. Chelovek, obshchestvo, priroda
1888-1902, sostavitel´ U. Subkhanberdina (Amaty: Gylim, 1994), 558 and later discussed by
A.A. Divaev, “K voprosu o kirgizkikh sudakh,” Okraina, no. 102 (1897).
18. However, this does not mean that new kinds of legal documents did not appear after
Russian colonization. As the Russians attempted to build a cadastral archive, qadis were asked
to produce certificates of testimonies (guwāhnāma) in Turki which testified the soundness of
purchase and sale of land. It goes without saying that analogous documents had not been
produced before, as it seems that the khanates and the emirates did not have a cadastral register.
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codification of Central Asian legal systems was never conceived as an interface
between the colonial state and the local society. The reason this happened is that
contrary to British officers in India, Russians did not want to take the place of
indigenous judges.19 Therefore, we cannot but agree with Virginia Martin when she
describes the introduction of the colonial statutes as “a failure of codification.”20
This is the reason why, even though local legal practice was known to the Russians
administering Turkestan, they did not see it as being subject to reform. 
Elections for the Local Administration
The 1867 Provisional Statute officially introduced voting for two administrative
offices. As far as the settled population was concerned, the colonial enactment
ruled that administrators with police and fiscal duties (aksakals),21 and judiciaries
(qadis) would be elected every three years.22 The system, however, was not based
on direct voting. Only the ellikboshi,23 the representatives of 50 households in the
communities in every defined area of settlement, such as a city district or a village,
cast a ballot.24 In the same way, nomads could elect administrators with the same
duties as the aksakals25 at the volost´ and aul levels,26 as well as the judiciaries
(biys) for ‘ādat-based courts.27 In order to become effective, the result of such
elections had to be confirmed by the colonial authority.
Why did the Russians introduce a norm of this sort? As it appeared only a few
years after the Great Reforms, one is tempted to interpret the policy in relation to
the creation of the zemstvo in Western Russia.28 As in the Volga-Ural regions and
Siberia all the estates of a given community were granted the right to elect a local
19. On this point see Alan K. Scott, “Framed, Blamed and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic
Jurisprudence in Colonial South Asia,” Modern Asian Studies, 35, 2 (May, 2001): 257-313.
20. Martin, op. cit., 51.
21. In Turki sources āqsaqāl, or mīngbāshī. 
22. “Proekt polozheniia…,” art. cit., § 118, 217.
23. In Turki and Russian the term was respectively spelled as īllīkbāshī and piatidesiatnik.
24. “Proekt polozheniia…,” art. cit., § 119.
25. Ibid., § 125.
26. Ibid., § 85-97.
27. It goes without saying that the administrative subdivision of territories inhabited by nomads
was different compared to settled areas: the size of an aul — the basic administrative unit of a
nomadic area — is not directly comparable to that of a village (kishlak) or a city district
(kvartal). For more information on the proportions and the procedures adopted in elections of
volost´ governors and biys, see Zhanar Dzhampeisova, Kazakhskoe obshchestvo i pravo v
poreformennoi stepi (Astana: ENU im. L.N. Gumileva, 2006), 164 and passim. 
28. On this issue see Aleksei Volvenko, “The Zemstvo Reform, the Cossacks, and
Administrative Policy on the Don, 1864-1882,” in J. Burbank, M. von Hagen, A. Remnev, eds.,
Russian Empire. Space, People, Power, 1700-1930, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 2007), 348-365.
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government,29 so the Muslims of Central Asia were allowed to create organs of
self-administration (samoupravlenie) on the basis of democratic principles.30
However, in addition to expressing the colonial government’s desire to spread
enlightened social ideas, the introduction of the new regulation was pragmatic. As
the Russians did not know the indigenous population and feared the traditional
patronage system of the khans, they hoped that if granted the right to vote, the locals
would choose the most respectable person among their peers (bolee pochitaemoe
litso), a person whose moral virtues would also guarantee he would be skilled in
administrative work. Consequently colonial officers could avoid the risk of
choosing the wrong person as this was no longer their responsibility.31
For Turkestani Muslims, electing their own administrators was a true reform, a
real change from the past. In fact, in precolonial times the centralized
administration of the khanates used to appoint its representatives (‘amaldār), even
at the village level. The appointment to a certain administrative position was
conceived as a means to establish reciprocity between the state and its
representatives based on an exchange of favors: if an administrator proved to be
loyal to the state, he would enjoy certain advantages, the most common being tax
exemption.32 This meant that behind an appointment made by the local ruler or
representatives of the state there were often factions lobbying for an official
administrative position. In fact, as endorsement from a local governor usually
involved fiscal privileges, it is likely that these benefits were redistributed among
the group who supported a candidature. This is why, for example, under the
Bukharan emirs someone could be appointed to the post of aksakal after being
officially endorsed by local notables.33
The introduction of the electoral process among the Muslim population of
Tashkent initially met with resistance from the scholars (‘ulamā’). At the beginning
29. It is perhaps worth recalling that Muslims under the authority of the Orenburg Muslim
Spiritual Administration were represented in the Siberian zemstva, while such institutions were
never established in Central Asia. On this issue see Norihiro Naganawa, “Molding the Muslim
Community through the Tsarist Administration: Mahalla under the Jurisdiction of the Orenburg
Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905,” Acta Slavica Iaponica, 23 (2006): 101-123.
30. N. Mordvinov, “Administratsiia u osedlikh inorodtsev Turkestana,” Russkii Vestnik, (iiun´
1899): 330.
31. Ershov, “Neskol´ko slov o vyborakh,” Turkestanskie Vedomosti, 75 (1908): 105.
32. R.N. Nabiev, Iz istorii kokandskogo khanstva (Feodal´noe khoziaistvo Khudoiar-Khana)
(Tashkent: FAN, 1973), 242 and passim. It should be noted that such fiscal privileges could be
bestowed as a tarkhān status granting immunity mainly “to religious figures such as prominent
Sufi or members of sacred lineages,” William Wood, A Collection of Tarkhan Yarlïqs from the
Khanate of Khiva, Papers on Inner Asia, n° 38 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2005), 29-
30. This also holds true for other regions of precolonial Central Asia, such as the Ferghana
Valley, cf. A. Juvonmardiev, XVI-XIX asrlarda Farghonada er-suv masalalariga doir
(Tashkent: FAN, 1965), documents no. 18/42, 105/71, 6/81. It is worth recalling that a state
appointment to official duties did not ipso facto imply the privileges described. 
33. This is a copy of a document of endorsement for the position of aksakal (khatt-i āqsaqālī)
for the district (tūmān) of Tushmak originally made in 1301/1883-4, cf. Munsha’āt-i Mirzā
Bahādir Khwāja b. Husayn Khwāja-i Pīrmastī, ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies,
Academy of Sciences, inv. no. 2667, f. 125v.
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of 1868, the colonial establishment set up a special commission whose task was to
explain the main issues of the Provisional Statute to the locals.34 Forty individuals,
including scholars and notables, had the possibility to openly discuss colonial
polity with Russian officials and raise questions regarding its implementation.
When the commission touched upon the issue of the election of the judiciary, some
‘ulamā’ held that it would be contrary to the sharī‘at. Paving the way for future
collaboration in the realm of Islamic jurisprudence, the special commission asked
that the ‘ulamā’ resolve the question in accordance with Islamic law. Accordingly,
some of them resorted to a collection of legal opinions (fatāwā) called Fusūl al-
‘Imādī.35 Quoting a passage in a chapter on qadis, they issued an authoritative
opinion which held that notwithstanding the fact that the governor was not a
Muslim, the Muslim community had the right to endorse his qadi: the condition was
that the Muslims had to gather and express agreement on the person to choose.36
As we noted above, the ellikboshis were the individuals immediately
responsible for the functioning of the election system. For example, in Tashkent the
ellikboshis of each of the four city districts had to gather and elect one qadi and six
aksakals. One of them would have police duties while the other five would become
members of the Economic Administration37 of the city, which was the institution
set up to levy taxes from the indigenous population.38 In addition, the Russian
administration opted for elections as the means for choosing functionaries to
oversee irrigation (arigh-aksakals)39 and those who would serve as assistants to
each aksakal.40
In the years following the first elections, Muslims in Tashkent used the same
procedure to choose individuals for a wide variety of positions with social
significance. In 1872, the shopkeepers (dukāndār) of the main bazaar in the
34. F. Azadaev, Tashkent vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka. Ocherki sotsial´no-ekonomicheskoi i
politicheskoi istorii, Tashkent: Izdatel´stvo Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, 1959), 96.
35. It is a work also known as Fusūl al-ahkām fī usūl al-ahkām, compiled in Samarkand in 621/
1253 by Abū al-Fath Zayn al-Dīn b. a. Bakr ‘Imād al-Dīn b. ‘Alī b. a. Bakr (d. after 670/1271-
2), cf. Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur, zweite Auflage, S 1, (Leiden,
New York, Köln: Brill, 1996), 656. It was a text widely used by Muslim jurists in Central Asia,
and extensively quoted in the opinions given by the jurists as well as in the lists of books left by
local scholars, cf. Asāmī-i kitābhāy-i mawjūda ba dast-i faqīr az manqūlāt-i bahr al-manāfiq,
ms. Samarkand, State Museum of History, Art and Archeology, inv. no. 4089/9, f. 3r. The list
bears the seal of Mullā Abū al-Qāsim Muftī, which is dated 1322/1904-5. See also
N.P. Ostroumov, Islamovedenie. Shariat po shkole (mazkhab) Abu-Khanify (Tashkent: Tip.
Pri. Kants. Turk. Gen.-Gub., 1912), 17.
36. TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 16, d. 66, l. 7-6. This is a trilingual document in Arabic, Persian and
Turki.
37. The Russian and Turki terms to denote the institution were respectively khoziaistvennoe
upravlenie and dūma. It is perhaps worth noting that the Muslims “Turkified” the Russian term
duma, which at that time stood for “municipality.”
38. “Proekt polozheniia…,” art. cit., § 245-248.
39. In Turki arīgh-āqsāqāl, mīrāb. 
40. The minutes of the election of all the indigenous administration of Tashkent can be found in
Zhurnaly zasedaniia tashkentskoi organizatsionnoi komissii, TsGARUz, F. I-36, op. 16, d. 66,
ll. 12-86ob.
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Russian part of Tashkent submitted a petition to City Commandant Pukalov asking
him to let them elect a new aksakal after the death of the old one.41 Similarly, the
wood sellers (yaghāch-furūsh) working in the Tashkent market (iarmarka), asked
the Russian administration to confirm the election of their aksakal.42 Having an
aksakal for each bazaar guild was in line with local tradition.43 But electing the
madrasa staff was certainly something new: in the same year, the mullahs of the
Khwāja Ahrār Madrasa, relying on the support of the ellikboshis and the notables
(yūrt-yākhshīlārī) of the district in which the building was located (Sibzar),
submitted to the city commandant a request for permission to elect a new mudarris
from among the faculty of the institute.44
Within a few years, the election procedure became an instrument local
communities could use to take over the administration of mosques, madrasas and
charitable endowments (waqf). As the understaffed colonial administration could
not closely control every election, it was easy for local groups to persuade the
Russians of the necessity of new appointments. Such procedures usually involved
two steps: a petition from a given community and a document stating that the
electors agreed to choose one individual from among their fellow citizens. For
example in 1873 the ellikboshis and the population of the mahalla Sakichman in the
Kukcha district protested against the inadequacy of the mullahs and the teachers
(mudarris) of the Būrī Ishān Khwāja Madrasa and asked City Commandant
Medinskii to confirm the appointment of Mullā Muhammad Zūnnūn to the post of
mudarris.45 Along with the petition, the Russian officers received a “document of
election” (sāylāw khatt) with the signatures of all the mullahs of the mosque,
stating that they had decided on this course of action on the basis of an agreement
(ittifāq īlān).46 The same thing happened with the Īshān Qūlī Dādkhwāh Madrasa:
41. ‘Arz-nāma. Tāshkand shahr-nī Pūlakuwchī hākim-mīzgha piyān bāzārinda, TsGARUz,
f. I-36, op. 1, d. 641, l. 45. The original was then translated into Russian as Proshenie
torgovogo obshchestva voskresenskogo bazara, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 641, l. 38-38ob. It
is perhaps worth noting that the original petition in Arabic script addresses the bazaar with the
word piyān, which is the turkified form of the Russians term p´ianyi used to denote the
voskresenskii bazar. On the bazaar see A.I. Dobrosmyslov, Tashkent v proshlom i
nastoiashchem. Istoricheskii ocherk, vypusk vtoroi (Tashkent: Tip. Portseva, 1911), 182-183.
42. 1872-nchī yilda 7nchī sintabrda hurmatlū Tāshkand hākimīgha, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1,
d. 641, l. 48. For the document which confirms the election of the aksakals for the wood sellers
on the grounds that they represent a considerable number of sarts within the Russian part of the
city, see TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 641, l. 50.
43. Nabiev, op. cit., 240-241.
44. ‘Izzatlū hurmatlū ūlūgh martabalū Tāshkand hākimīgā, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 641,
l. 45-45ob. Apparently the petition was successful, as the Russian administration soon received
a document with the results of the elections. The mullahs had elected Mullā Muhammad ‘Azīm
Khān, a qadi in the Beshagach district, as the new mudarris, cf. TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1,
d. 641, l. 55-56.
45. 1872-nchī yilda 27nchī dīkābrda ūlūgh martabalū Tāshkand hākimī pūlkūfnīk Mīdīnīskī
khizmatlārīgha, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 2, d. 883, l. 4-4ob. 
46. Sāylāw khatt 1873nchī yilinda 15nchī ghīnwārda, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 2, d. 883, l. 2ob-3.
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after the death of the mudarris, the mullahs and the teachers acted independently
and elected (sāylādūk) a new individual to that post.47
Winners and Losers: qadis and aksakals
The colonial regulation introducing the election procedure for administrative
appointments created winners and losers. Newly elected individuals enjoyed
economic privileges as well as enhanced moral authority. It is likely, for example,
that newly elected teachers were the recipients of their madrasas’ tuition fees, while
a newly appointed imam would probably profit from the redistribution of the pious
donations in cash made to the endowment attached to his mosque.48 Conversely, this
system excluded many other individuals from access to such sources of income. The
most striking example is that of the pious endowments which had been administered
by individuals inheriting the duty of administrator (mutawallī) for generations. In
Tashkent, for example, the properties willed to the Madrasa of Khwāja Ahrār had
been administered by a descendant of the founder of the mortmain, a certain Tūra
Khān. The income stemming from the lands donated to the madrasa had been
divided into three parts: one was set aside for paying the faculty of the madrasa, one
for expenses for its restoration, and one for the family of the mutawallī. After the
Russian takeover, the mullahs contended (nizā‘ qīlīb) that the administrator was not
entitled to take the part of the money due to his offspring as he was alone, and elected
one of their own relatives to the post of administrator. Tūra Khān found himself
deprived of his salary and had to sell some of his property.49
Abandoning the system of patronage in force under the khanate’s administration
sharpened existing factionalism and stirred up open confrontation between local
groups. One of the most telling examples is the election to the post of imam of the
mosque of the Sarkhamdan mahalla in Tashkent.50 Dissatisfied with their imam, the
majority of the people of the district (aksar-i qawm wa ahālī) elected a new one,
Muhammad Rasūl Khwāja, known to be a man of learning. But then a minority
group (aqall az ān qawm wa ahālī) complained that they wanted to elect another
person. The strife between the two factions ended with a lawsuit filed with the
Russian administration.51 
47. ‘Izzatlū hurmatlū ūlūgh martabalū Tāshkand hākimīgā, TsGARuz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1588,
l. 1-1ob.
48. The most recent discussion of this subject is to be found in El´ër Karimov, Regesty
kaziiskikh dokumentov i khanskikh iarlikov khivinskogo khanstva XVII — nachala XX v.
(Tashkent: FAN, 2007), 25-28.
49. Siz ūlūgh martabat-lū afzaliyyat-panāhgha Tāskandlīk Bīsh-Yaghāch dahasīda tūrghuwchī
Tūra Khān Tūra Jān-ūghlī Khwāja Ahrār awlādlārīdīn ‘arz-nāma, TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1,
d. 39, l. 1.
50. The account is in TsGARuz, f. I-36, op.1, d. 883, l. 6-6ob.
51. Dar mas’ala ki aksar-i qawm wa ahālī-i mahalla sarkhamdān az mahallāt-i mashhūra-i
balda-i Tāshkand, cf. TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 883, l. 7. 
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The most and least profitable administrative positions open to the indigenous
settled population were respectively those of tax collector and judge - aksakal and
qadi. The 1867 Provisional Statute made no provision for paying qadis a salary, nor
did it allow them to receive payment from the claimants and defendants in the cases
they heard, while it stated that the aksakals’ salary was to be decided publicly
during elections (§121). When the regulations of the Provisional Statute were
explained to the Tashkent Muslim notables and scholars, the Russians made clear
that the basic salary would be 300 rubles per year.52 The first evidence we have of
the implementation of the regulations in Tashkent is a document produced just
some days after this discussion on the Provisional Statute. In this case, the
ellikboshis gathered in order to decide the salaries of native-born administrators: 
On 19 March 1868 we, the representatives of each and every of the 50
households of the Shaykhantahur district of the City of Tashkent, agreed to sign
and seal [the present certificate as] some chief administrators had been elected
and appointed. Every year our newly elected aksakal and his assistants will
receive 375 rubles, while the arigh-aksakal and his assistants will receive 300
rubles from the aforementioned district in accordance with the economic
council. The aksakal, the arigh-aksakal and their assistants will not oversee any
volost´. Our qadi will receive a fee only for marriages. In good faith we signed
and affixed our seal to attest to the soundness [of the certificate].53
From the content of this document, it is evident that tax collectors in fact received a
yearly salary, the amount of which was far higher than the fees the Islamic judiciary
could ever hope to be paid.54 However, the aksakals’ duties made their position
much more at risk than that of the qadis. Apparently, levying taxes in the name of
the White Tsar was conceived by Muslims in a different way than ruling in the
name of God’s law. The Russians knew that taxation was a sensitive issue,
especially in Turkestan, and for this reason Tashkent Muslims had been officially
ordered to address all their claims (zhaloby) to the chancellery of the city
commandant on issues regarding malpractice by aksakals.55
It was not long before the colonial administration began to receive petitions
complaining of injustice. At the beginning of November 1868, in response to the
52. Zhurnaly zasedaniia tashkentskoi organizatsionnoi komissii 1868 g. ianvaria 24 dnia,
TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 16, d. 66, l. 2.
53. Sana bir mīng īkkī yūz saksān tūrt zū al-qa‘da, TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 12, l. 1. 
54. It is perhaps worth noting that from 1869 to 1870 the salaries of Tashkent arigh-aksakals
fluctuated between 300 and 400 silver rubles, cf. Zav. irrigatsii prav. storony reki Chirchika,
TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 634, l. 32-32ob. This information supports the reliability of the
certificate issued by the Shaykhantaur ellikboshis.
55. Zhiteli vsegda mogut i obiazany obrashchatsia so svoimi zhalobami k nachal´niku goroda.
This is how the special commission for the implementation of the 1867 Provisional Statute in
Tashkent explained that the Tashkent city commandant would be the recipient of Muslims’
appeals, cf. Zhurnal zasedaniia tashkentskoi organizatsionnoi komissii, 1868 g. ianvaria 24
dnia, TsGARUz, f. I-1, op. 16, d. 66, l. 1ob. 
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Russian administration’s willingness to investigate complaints concerning
wrongdoings by tax collectors and members of the economic council,56 the
ellikboshis of the Shaykhantaur district accused the arigh-aksakal In‘ām Khwāja of
having committed illegal actions (sharī‘at zakūnīda yūq īshlārnī qīladūrghān
būlūb).57 Nor did it take long for the authorities to act on the complaints. In
December 1868, the aksakal of Kukcha was deposed after having been found guilty
of corruption.58 One year later, the aksakal of Sibzar wrote a letter to the city
commandant saying: 
Showing my own loyalty and devotion to the [administrative] service, some
time ago I revealed the inopportune behavior of swindlers and wrongdoers
(būzūq zālim ādamlārnīng chākkī īshlārdan), who are still acting among my
foolish kinsmen (manim nādān aqribālārīm). For this reason, instead of
benevolence, I gained many enemies (dūshmān), who, from this time on, using
the people’s animosity towards me as a pretext, began to defame (yumānlāy) my
reputation in front of the government with testimonies of every kind.59 
As the number of complaints against the aksakals increased, Russian administrators
realized that satisfying such demands would contradict the rationale for which they
had opted to introduce elections. As early as 1871 they began refusing to respond to
such petitions. Russian officers replied that, in so far as tax collectors had been
elected by the ellikboshis in their district on the basis of their ability, they were not
willing to remove these individuals from office.60 Petitions and complaints
notwithstanding, elections to the position of aksakal were held regularly every three
years. From 1868 until 1880, those chosen underwent a complete reshuffle with
every election.61 
A completely different picture is given by the elections of the qadis. Turnover
among the Islamic judiciary in Tashkent during the period of the Provisional
Statute was much slower, as demonstrated by a comparison of qadis’ registers62
with the seals on legal documents in the collection of the Tashkent chief judge.63
56. TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 40, l. 2.
57. Ibid.
58. The documents concerning this case can be found in TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 37: O
vziatochnistve Kukchinskago aksakala Osmana Kariia.
59. Hurmatlū Tāshkand hākimīning lawāzimīn adā qīlghuwchī Tāshkand shahrīnda Sibzār
dahasīnī āqsaqālī Nazīr Muhammad dūklādnūy zāfīska, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 634, l. 13.
One year later, the aksakal of the Russian bazaar was accused of alcohol abuse and prosecuted,
Tashkentskoe politseiskoe upravlenie 23 iiulia 1870 g., TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 642, l. 12.
60. 4 ianvaria 1871 g. Ego Vysokoblagorodiiu Nachal´niku g. Tashkenta, TsGARUz, f. I-36,
op. 1, d. 641, l. 2-2ob. 
61. I compared the documents on the 1874 elections, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 883, l. 34-35,
with the ones on the activities of the aksakals between 1877 and 1880, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1,
d. 1330, 1763.
62. Cf. Tāshkandning qāzīlāri wa shahr siyāz qāzīlārin akt wa hukm daftarlarī, TsGARUz, f. I-
362, op. 1, d. 59, l. 7-22.
63. TsGARUz, f. I-164: Tashkentskii Kazi-Kalian.
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Our method was based on the premise that since according to the Provisional
Statute, qadis were provided with a new seal by the Russian administration each
time they were elected (§223),64 deciphering the seals would allow us to see how
many times a given qadi was reelected. In the district of Shaykhantaur the post of
qadi was held by Muhammad Sharīf Khwāja b. Pādshāh Khwāja ‘Umarī from 1868
to 1889.65 In Sibzar the post of judge remained in the hands of two families from
1868 until 1883. The first to be elected was Muhammad Hakīm Khwāja Īshān,
already appointed to the office of Chief Judge (Qāzī Kalān) in 1280/1863 by a
decree issued by Mullā ‘Alī Qulī (‘Alīmqūl), during his rule in Kokand (1863 to
1865).66 When he died in 1870,67 the post was inherited by his son Muhammad
Muhiyy al-Dīn Khwāja,68 who remained in office until 1882 (thus for four terms of
office). He was followed by Īshān ‘Azīzlār Khwāja, the son of Īshān Āy Khwāja
Khān, who had previously held the post of Shaykh al-Islām during the last years of
the Kokand khanate.69 In the district of Kukcha, ‘Abdullāh Jān, himself son of a
qadi (Bābā Jān), had already been elected to serve as a judge in 1868, and was
reelected in 187170 and 1874,71 holding office until 1880, when the position passed
to ‘Umar Bīk.72 In 1883 the Kukcha ellikboshis elected Mullā Bāy Mīrzā,73 while in
1886 they reelected ‘Abdullāh Jān.74 Only in the district of Beshagach between the
64. The colonial administration provided the Tashkent qadis with seals both in Russian and in
Arabic. For the discussion among colonial administrators on the question, see TsGARUz, f. I-
36, op. 1, d. 431, l. 15-16.
65. His seals are dated 1871, 1874, 1883 respectively in TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 2, l. 2;
Ibid., d. 6, l. 58; Ibid., d. 6, l. 8ob.
66. Mulla Muhammad Yunus Djan Shighavul Dadkhah Tashkandi, The Life of ‘Alimqul. A
Native Chronicle of Nineteenth Century Central Asia, edited and translated by
T.K. Beisembiev (London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 76.
67. G. Voennomu Gubernatoru Syr-Dar´inskoi oblasti. TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 725, l. 3.
68. To our knowledge the earliest seal belonging to Muhiyy al-Dīn Khwāja is the one attached
to the following document: TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 6, l. 65: Qāzī Muhammad Muhiyy al-
Dīn Khwāja b. Muhammad Hakīm Khwāja Īshān Qāzī Kalān, 1286/1870 — circular, 4 cm,
while the latest one was Mullā Muhammad Muhiyy al-Dīn Khwāja Qāzī b. Muhammad Hakīm
Khwāja Īshān Qāzī Kalān ‘Alawī, 1304/1886-7 — circular, 4 cm, cf. TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1,
d. 7, l. 21.
69. Qāzī-i Sibzār ‘Azīzlār Khwāja Īshān b. Īshān Āy Khwāja Hājjī Shaykh al-Islām, 1300/
1883 — circular, 4 cm, cf. TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 7, l. 23. The royal patent with the
appointment of Īshān Āy Khwāja to the duty of Shaykh al-Islām in 1279/1862-3 is in
TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 1, l. 7.
70. Cf. the seal of Qāzī ‘Abdullāh Jān b. Qādī Bābā-Jān marhūm, 1288/1871 — circular, 4 cm,
in TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 6, l. 59.
71. 8/9 aprelia 1874 g.. […] spisok tuzemtsev, izbrannykh v dolzhnosti na sleduiushee
trekhletie, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1. d. 883, l. 3.
72. Cf. the seal of Qāzī Muhammad ‘Umar Bīk b. Muhammad Jānī Bīk, 1297/1880 — circular,
4 cm, TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 6, l. 19, 20.
73. Cf. the seal of Qāzī Mullā Bāy Mīrzā b. Mīrzā Āghalīk, 1300/1883-4 — circular, 4 cm,
TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 6, l. 73.
74. Cf. the seal of Qāzī ‘Abdullāh Jān b. Dāmullā Qāzī Kālān Bābā-Jān marhūm, 1304/1886-
7 — circular, 4 cm, TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 6, l. 76.
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years 1868 and 1886 do we observe any instability, with four different people being
elected to the post of judge. Muhammad ‘Azīm was elected in 1868 and 1871.75 In
1874 the ellikboshis elected ‘Ādil Khwāja Īshān but the Russian administration was
not pleased with their choice. City Commandant Medinskii was disturbed by the
moral authority ‘Ādil Khwāja Īshān held over the local population and wrote to
Military Governor Golovachev that the newly elected qadi might undermine
Russian power as he belonged to the social group of the ishans.76 He asked the
military governor not to confirm the election, and to appoint Muhammad ‘Azīm
instead. Probably afraid of arousing popular unrest, the Russian administration
tried to collect information from other qadis that would be damaging to Muhammad
‘Azīm’s reputation, but the jurists answered that they did not know of any
wrongdoing he had committed.77 Only the ellikboshis complained about him,
arguing that nobody from his district had been summoned to the qadis’ assembly
(mahkama), and that he often intervened in disputes concerning people from the
other three districts.78 Golovachev was reluctant to choose Muhammad ‘Azīm
instead of ‘Ādil Khwāja Īshān. He did not like either of them, as they were both
very influential. Finally, Muhammad ‘Azīm himself solved the problem: he wrote
to Medinskii to complain that as he had been working as a judge and mudarris since
the Russian conquest, his physical condition had worsened (bītāblīk) and his
finances had also undergone a decline (yir-suwlārīm mu‘attal qālghuw).79
Therefore, he asked the city commandant to allow him to resign from the duty of
qadi. Accordingly, Golovachev ordered Medinsikii to organize new elections.80
This time, Sayyid Bāqī Jān was elected to the judgeship of Beshagach.81 He
remained in office until 1883, when he was removed in a blaze of accusations of
corruption from the people of his district.82 He was replaced by ‘Ādil Khwāja,
elected in 1883.83
75. Cf. the seal of Qāzī Muhammad ‘Azīm b. Muhammad Rajab, 1287/1871 — circular, 3.6
cm, TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 6, l. 61 and TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1. d. 883, l. 3.
76. G.nu Voennomu Gunerbatoru syr-dar´inskoi oblasti, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 883,
l. 30-31ob.
77. ‘Izzat wa marhamatlīq wa ulugh martabalīq Tāshkand hākimī pūlkāwnīkgha, TsGARUz,
f. I-36, op. 1, d. 883, l. 30. 
78. ‘Izzatlū wa hurmatlū wa bīk martabalū Tāshkand hākimī Mīdīn-Iskī khizmatlārīgha,
TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 883, l. 29.
79. The petition written by Muhammad ‘Azīm asking that he be allowed to resign from the
office of qadi is in TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 883, l. 37.
80. Sekretno. 10 iiuniia 1874 g. Voennyj gubernator Syr-Dar´inskoi oblasti nachal´niku g.
Tashkenta, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 883, l. 46-49. 
81. Cf. the seal Qāzī Sayyid Bāqī-Jān b. Abū Qāsim-Khān Īshān ‘Alawī, 1291/1874 —
circular, 4 cm, TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 7, l. 3. 
82. S zhalobami na Kaziia Seid Baki khana Abdul’ Kasym Kan-Ishanova na nespravedlivyi
razbor del, vziatki i t.p., TsGARUz, f. I- 36, op. 2, d. 2240. 
83. Cf. the seal of Qāzī-i Bīsh Āghāch ‘Ādil Khwāja Īshān b. Āftāb Khwāja ‘Alawī, 1300/
1883-4 — circular, 4.2 cm, TsGARUz, f. I-164, op. 1, d. 6, l. 73.
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In short, the introduction of elections did not produce great instability among the
qadis of Tashkent. Reelection was common. In this respect, the cases of the
judiciary of the Shaykhantaur and Sibzar districts are telling. As far as turnover
among the qadis is concerned, it should be kept in mind that in 1883 the individuals
serving as judges changed in every district. The most plausible explanation is the
major political change that occurred in the colonial administration. Governor-
General von Kaufman had died in 1882 and been replaced by Mikhail Cherniaev.
The fact that there was a comparably higher degree of instability in the district of
Beshagach was mainly due to Russian interference in the election of the qadi in
1874 and the subsequent corruption scandal.
The Kazakhs and their biys in Tashkent
The indigenous administration of Tashkent did not oversee the rights and obligations
of the settled population alone. The town also counted a small Kazakh community of
presumably no more than 500 individuals.84 Moreover, the city was surrounded by
areas which were occupied principally by nomads. Administratively these territories
belonged to the Kurama uezd, created in 1871 after the dismantlement of the Jizzakh
uezd.85 It was not rare to encounter Kazakhs on the city outskirts. While inspecting
the city limits in 1868, colonial administrators found a number of Kazakhs (Kirgizy)
living outside the city walls. Some of them used the well-irrigated areas around the
city as winter pasture (zimovki),86 while others were probably semi-nomads who
had settled along the rivers Qarasu and Chirchik (southwest of the city) during the
winter and said they wished to use the land for agricultural purposes.87 The most
numerous community of Kazakhs was to be found between the Tashkent city limits
and the village of Kuyluk, the center of the Kurama uezd.88
Until recently it has been argued that in precolonial Central Asia biys — both
those acting as clan leaders and those who were judges of customary law courts —
were chosen by the local nomadic communities on the basis of their moral authority
and their knowledge of ‘ādat.89 This argument has been emphasized to show that
the introduction of the election-based system had a negative effect on the practice
of ‘ādat, as it allowed individuals to become biys even if they were not particularly
84. In 1870 Russians statisticians counted 420 Kirghiz, cf. “Prilozhenie № 1. Naselenie Syr-
Dar´inskoi oblasti po plemenam i soslovijam, na osnovanii statisticheskikh svedenii 1870
goda,” in Zapiski imperatorskago russkago geograficheskago obshchestva po otdeleniiu
statistiki. T. IV, Iu.E. Iansona, red. (SPb., 1874).
85. In 1887 the Kurama uezd was dismantled and these territories were incorporated into the
newly established Tashkent uezd.
86. Zhurnal Iv otdeleniia Tashkentskoi organizatsionnoi komissii 15 marta 1868 g., TsGARUz,
f. I-1, op. 16, d. 66, l. 81ob.
87. Ibid., l. 71ob.
88. Ibid., l. 94.
89. Martin, op. cit., 26-27.
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knowledgeable about customary law.90 Besides the fact that this view reifies an
argument that was widespread in periodical literature of the late Tsarist period,91 it
fails to take into account that not all Central Asian nomadic and tribal groups had
been completely independent from the administrations of local rulers and that ‘ādat
could be the legal system adopted by nomadic and semi-nomadic groups who lived
side by side with settled communities under the khanates of the southern territories
of Central Asia. 
In fact, I contend that in precolonial times, the biys — both as clan leaders and
‘ādat-based judiciary — were under the control of the state, and that the holders of
these positions had the same status as other notables appointed directly by the
khanates’ central administration.92 Royal patents (yārlīgh) have come down to us
which show that there were people appointed to serve as biys for the nomadic
population surrounding the main cities of the region.93 Moreover, many documents
indicate that the biys appointed by the central administration of the Kokand Khanate
were granted the same fiscal privileges (e.g. tax exemptions) as other administrative
figures such as jurists or state officials, or else allotted a portion of the harvest.94
In Tashkent too the appointment of the judiciary for the sharī‘at- or ‘ādat-based
courts of the city was directly controlled by Kokand. Like qadis and muftis95, the
biys of the Tashkent Kazakh community were appointed by the governor of
Kokand.96 However, the analogy notwithstanding, after the Russian conquest and
the implementation of the Provisional Statute, the changes in the way biys and qadis
were chosen had different outcomes. While the latter could be reelected for more
90. Martin, op. cit., 99 and passim; Brusina, “Obychnoe pravo kochevogo naseleniia
Turkestana…” art. cit., 219, 220, 224-5.
91. See for example, “Iz Orenburga,” in Vostochnoe obozrenie, 33 (1882), and Kh., “Kirgizskii
narodnyi sud,” Orenburgskaia gazeta, 53 (1908).
92. P.P. Ivanov, “Ocherki po istorii karakalpakov,” in Materialy po istorii karakalpakov.
Sbornik. Trudy instituta vostokovedeniia, t. VII (M.-L.: Nauka, 1935), 53. On biy as an official
post in the Khivan Khanate’s administration, see Dokumenty arkhiva khivinskikh khanov po
istorii i etnografii karakalpakov. Podbor dokumentov, vvedenie, perevod, primechaniia i
ukazateli Iu.E. Bregelia (M.: Nauka, 1967), 56. 
93. See the following patents (yārlīgh) issued in Khiva in the 1830s and 1840s, which
appointed biys within the Kazakh tribes in Khorezm, TsGARUz, f. I-125 (Chancellery of the
Khivan Khan), op. 2, d. 9, l. 1; TsGARUz, f. I-125, op. 2, d. 12, l. 1; TsGARUz, f. I-125, op. 2,
d. 14, l. 1; TsGARUz, f. I-125, op. 2, d. 15, l. 4. According to Beisembiev, the biy of Qurghan-
Tepa was also appointed by the Kokand administration, cf. The Life of ‘Alimqul…, 87.
94. On biys being rewarded or tax exempted by the administration of the Kokand Khanate, see
A.L. Troitskaia, Katalog arkhiva kokandskikh khanov XIX veka (M.: Nauka, 1986),
documents no. 838-841, 1093, 1290, 1364, 1637, 1640, 1648, 1695. On Kirghiz biys being
given official seals by the Kokand rulers see Kyrgyzdar. Sanjyra, tarykh, muras, salt, 2-tom
(Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 1993), 552-553.
95. Cf. the royal patents in Katalog iz fonda sredneaziatskikh zhalovannykh gramot iz fonda
instituta vostokovedeniia im Abu Raikhana Beruni Akademii Nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan, in
A. Urunbaev, G. Dzhuraeva, S. Gulomov, sost., Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte, Mitteilungen
des SFB/10, 23 (2007), no. 18, 19, 68, 69, 81.
96. S. Soodanbekov, Obshchestvennyi i gosudarstvennyi stroi Kokandskogo khanstva
(Bishkek, 2000), 81.
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than a three-year term of office, the biys were subjected to a great deal of instability
because of fluctuations in the support they received from the Kazakh community.
This began immediately after the establishment of colonial rule: some months after
his election as biy, Mulla Kushuk was accused by members of his own community to
the colonial authorities of acting against the Russian government and was
consequently removed from his position.97 This instability went to such an extent
that elections of biys never occurred regularly and were not held simultaneously
with the ones for aksakals and qadis, as one would expect. This happened mainly
because once elected, the biy was immediately the target of accusations of
wrongdoings and illicit behavior. However, such accusations were not grounded on
the biys’ ignorance of customary law; they originated from a different rationale.
The most telling example of how unstable a biy’s position could be is the case of
Altybay Qulbay-ughli. His story, as it has come down to us in the archives, begins
with a letter of complaint from Kazakhs in Tashkent at the beginning of 1873. The
Kazakhs were not dissatisfied with the way he performed his judicial duties, but
complained that he had been illicitly levying taxes on them.98 In fact, besides
holding the post of biy, Altybay claimed to be the fiscal administrator of the Kazakhs
of Tashkent,99 thus considering himself on a par with a volost´ administrator.100
Prosecuted by the Imperial court and found guilty, Altybay was attached to the
Russian army and sent to Khiva. One year later, in 1874, he returned to Tashkent.
Another petition immediately reached the colonial administration: this time, the
Kazakhs held that during the previous year their affairs had been satisfactorily
overseen by the local aksakals, but that since Altybay had returned to Tashkent, he
had been trying to convince Kazakhs to reelect him as their biy. Accordingly, they
asked the Tashkent city commandant not to let biy elections be held in Tashkent, as
they preferred to move to the Kurama uezd than to be obliged to take back
Altybay.101 At the end of the same year (1874), the Kazakhs had already changed
their minds. Their ellikboshis wrote to the city commandant requesting that he
appoint Altybay to his position as biy.102 However, the agreement between Altybay
and the Kazakh community was not destined to last very long. One and a half years
later (July 1876), the city commandant received another petition reporting that in
97. Ob udalenii biia Mully Kushuka iz sredy kochevogo naseleniia za nedobrozhelatel´nost´ k
russkomu pravitel´stvu, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1. d. 7, l. 1-7.
98. Zhaloby predsedatelia obshchestva kirgiz na nachal´nika ikh obshchestva po povodu togo,
chto poslednii obmannym putem sobiraet s nikh den´gi, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1. d. 958,
l. 100.
99. This claim should not be considered as odd. It is common knowledge that before the
colonial rule biys fulfilled, among other duties, that of tax collector, see Dokumenty arkhiva
khivinskikh khanov…, op. cit., 30-38 passim.
100. In fact, the Russians filed the letter as “a petition of the Tashkent Kazakhs against Altybay,
the volost´ administrator,” Zhaloby Tashkentskikh kirgiz na volostnogo pravitelia ikh Altybaia,
TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 958, l. 72-73ob.
101. Proshenie Marta 16 dnia 1874, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 883, l. 23-23ob.
102. Sūzimiz shūl-ki ūmīd ītāmīz-ki hākim-mīzdān Āltī Bāy biynī qadīmghī jāygha qūysāngīz
īkān dīb, cf. Tāshkand hākim-mīzgha, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 883, l. 26.
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1874 the Kazakhs had been ordered to elect a volost´ administrator with fiscal duties.
Altybay had proposed himself for the office and they had elected him, as “he had
promised not to offend us and not to impose illegal taxes.” However, now the
Kazakhs complained that between 1874 and 1876 Altybay had been collecting
yearly taxes from them, plus an annual salary of 300 rubles.103 
At this point, it is clear that there was a major confusion about the duties Altybay
was supposed to carry out: was he a biy or a volost´ administrator? The documents
addressed to the colonial government by the Kazakh community show that Altybay
was elected to both offices. Moreover, if he was only a judge he would not have had
the right to claim the 300 rubles, while acting as a volost´ administrator he would
have been entitled to a yearly salary of that kind.
While the Kazakhs’ lawsuit was being heard, the city commandant convened an
assembly of biys from the Kurama uezd. When questioned, the plaintiffs claimed
that Altybay had levied 1140 rubles from 240 Kazakh households. Altybay rejected
their accusation. The biys requested that four witnesses take an oath and testify.
When no one accepted, the biys “adjudicated the case according to customary law
and made the claim void” (qazāq ‘ādat birlān qīlghān da‘wāning bīkār dīb hukm
qīlib).104 The appeals procedure went on and in 1877 the Russian officers
ascertained that in effect Altybay had been assigned a salary of 300 rubles upon the
request of the selfsame Kazakhs who had brought the case against him.105 
By officially holding two positions, Altybay had undoubtedly made enemies:
not only did he have the judicial authority to oversee legal cases among the
Kazakhs and to levy taxes from them, but he could also claim the right to receive
both a salary as an administrator and a fee for every case he heard (biylik).106 It is
likely that other officers were disturbed by his increasing authority and his
favorable financial condition. In fact, Altybay informed the city commandant that
the Tashkent aksakals and the Kazakh ellikboshis were jointly orchestrating a
machination to vilify his reputation as biy.107 Altybay was right. In June, the
Kazakhs again petitioned the commandant, saying that they did not want to be
judged according to customary law (‘ārz-dādnī qazāqiyya ‘adādīncha sūrāmāqnī
103. 24 iiulia 1876, Ego Vysokoblagorodiiu gospodinu nachal´niku goroda Tashkent,
TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 1.
104. 1876nchī yilda 14nchī mīzānda Tāshkand hākimīgha qarāghān Qazāq fuqarālār,
TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 3.
105. TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 8-10.
106. Biylik as a fee the biy could charge was officially introduced by the Provisional Statute: it
could not exceed 10% of the value of a disputed property, while in cases of murder and slander
it was to be defined in accordance with local customs (soglasno obychaiam), cf. “Proekt
polozheniia…” art. cit., § 186. See also N.I. Grodekov, Kirgizy i karakirgizy syr-dar´inskoi
oblasti. Tom pervyi. Iuridicheskii byt (SPb., 1885). On cases when biylik was charged
arbitrarily see Martin, op. cit., 98. It appears that rather than being a colonial novelty, charging
biylik was a well-established practice before the arrival of the Russians, cf. Zagriazhskii, “O
narodnom sude u kochevago…” art. cit., 194.
107. 26 ianvaria 1877, Ego Vysokoblagorodiiu gospodinu nachal´niku goroda Tashkent,
TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 19.
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munāsīb kūrmāymīz), and, as they lived in Tashkent, they preferred their cases to
be adjudicated according to Islamic law (har īshīmiz wa yā janjālīmiz būlsa sharī‘at
birlān). They also requested that they be put under the jurisdiction of the aksakals.
The problem — they claimed — was again Altybay, as his behavior as a biy was
unjust (bizlārnī kūp jabīrlāndūrdī). Therefore, they asked that he be dismissed and
that the rule of sharī‘at be introduced among them.108 At the same time, they
repeatedly appealed to the colonial government, namely the city commandant, the
general and military governor, calling for the revision of the cases they had
previously lost.109 The persistence of the Kazakhs paid off: the colonial government
was particularly sensitive to the argument that an unqualified person was holding
the post of judge. The military governor transmitted the case to the state prosecutor
and at the beginning of 1878, he once again convened an assembly of the Kurama
biys, who in three different hearings ruled against Altybay. In order to pay all the
debts he had incurred, Altybay was deprived of his entire fortune.110 
Having learnt a lesson from his fellow Kazakhs, Altybay also presented appeals
to the colonial government. He did this twice: in April 1878, he wrote to City
Commandant Pukalov111 and in May, to Military Governor Trotskii.112 In both
letters, Altybay claimed to be a victim of injustice. He wrote that in 1876 Kazakh
ellikboshis had sued him for 284 rubles and the Kurama biys had prosecuted him
but found the claim baseless. Then, even though he had been acquitted, in 1877 the
Kazakhs appealed to Governor-General von Kaufman. The latter forwarded the
case to his assistant, who examined it and found again that the claim was
unfounded. Despite these two rulings in Altybay’s favor, the Kazakhs again turned
to the colonial administration in February 1878 and, finally, found someone who
accepted their appeal and ordered the assembly of Kurama biys to convene and
hear the lawsuits. These biys processed the cases, previous judgments
notwithstanding, and found him guilty. This time, Altybay’s perseverance paid
108. 1877nchī yilinda 13nchī jūzada Tāshkand ūyāzī-nīng hākimīgha Tāshkand īchīda qūl āstī
būlūb qarār qīlghuwchī qazāqiyyalārnīng kullan fuqarālārīdīn, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1,
d. 1214, l. 13.
109. Ego Vysokoblagorodiiu G. Nachal´niku g. Tashkenta, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214,
l. 15, 23. See also an undated report most probably written by the assistant to City Commandant
Bolozhevskii on the situation of the investigation ordered by von Kaufman in 1877, TsGARUz,
f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 31-32ob, and the final report on the investigation of the same case
ordered by Military Governor Trotskii in May 1878, K dokladu: 27 aprelia 1878, TsGARUz,
f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 24-25ob. 
110. Cf. the sentences of the assembly of the Kurama biys (Qūrāma ūyāzīnī siyāz biylārī),
TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 104, 105, 106.
111. Tāshkand hākimī Pūka-lūf-gha Tāshkand-da tūrghuwchi Qazāq Āltī Bāy Qul Biy ūghlī-
dān, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 29.
112. ‘Izzatlū wa hurmat-lū wa bīkmartaba-lū Turkistān wayānnāy Gūbirnāturī Tūrāt-īskī sīz-
nīng janābingīz-gha Tāshkand shahrī-nīng Bīsh Yaghāch būluwchī-nīng Qazāghī Āltī Bāy Biy
Qul Biy ūghlī-dān ‘ariza, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 45ob-46.
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off: the general-governor annulled the judgment and Altybay’s belongings were
returned to him.113 
As they had been told by the Kazakhs that they would prefer to be judged
according to Islamic law and had been petitioned for so many cases of wrongdoing,
the Russians thought that the community lacked anyone qualified to be elected to
the position of judge. Contrary to expectations, the Kazakhs insisted on having a
new biy and elected a person who had previously been favored by Altybay: Taybek
Berdi-ughli.114
Taybek himself had a rough time while carrying out his duties. His career did
not last one year. In the fall of 1880, three Kazakhs of the Kurama uezd were each
robbed of a camel. They claimed to have seen the animals with a certain Balkut
Shakurbay, a Kazakh from the city of Turkestan. At that time, Balkut was living in
the Sibzar district. Accordingly, the three Kazakhs filed the lawsuit against Balkut
in the presence of the aksakal of Sibzar, and Taybek was asked to hear the case.115
The investigation revealed that Balkut was guilty. Taybek then proposed the two
parties should apply the qarīndāsh, a legal mechanism in Kazakh customary law
(qazaq ‘adadmīzga muwāfiq) which involves a mediation between the two parties
in a dispute on the basis of kinship ties.116 Accordingly, it was ruled that the
defendant pay a given sum of money, and all parties expressed their satisfaction
with this agreement (īkkī taraf ūshbū bitīmga rāzī būlūb).117 
As legal documents show, the lawsuit was brought to a satisfactory conclusion
thanks to the use of local judicial customs. However, in March 1881 Balkut
denounced Taybek to the Russian government, claiming that the biy had
handcuffed him before the trial. The city commandant’s assistant began an
investigation. It turned out that when accused of robbery, Balkut became violent
and declared to the aksakal that he intended to escape. Taybek had been asked to
keep Balkut in custody, but fearing that the latter would flee to Turkestan before
being prosecuted, he decided to take a precautionary measure and handcuffed him.
Taybek was imprisoned and removed from office.118 The Russian administration
could not but acknowledge that nobody in the Kazakh community deserved to be
appointed to the post of biy. When the city commandant reported to the military
governor, he held that the Kazakh contingent of Tashkent was made up of
113. Pomoshchnik Voennogo Gubernatora Syrdar´inskoi oblasti, ianvaria 1879 goda,
TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 47-48ob.
114. Gospodinu I.d. Voennogo Gubernatora Syrdar´inskoi oblasti, 25 ianvaria 1879 goda,
TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1214, l. 29; 1877nchī yilda [sic] 6nchī ‘aqrābda Tāshkand
hākīmnīng khizmatlārīgha rāpū[r]t, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1330, l. 44.
115. 1880nchī yilīnda 27nchī jaddīda bizlār tūbānda tamghā sālghuwchī, TsGARUz, f. I-36,
op. 1, d. 1944, l. 10.
116. Kirgizskaia stepnaia gazeta…, op. cit., 764. 
117. 1880nchī yilinda 27nchī jaddīda bizlār tūbānda muhr bāsquwchī, TsGARUz, f. I-36,
op. 1, d. 1944, l. 11.
118. Akt, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 4-6.
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renegades from other uezds who were individuals of disputable morality.119 Most
probably, rumors were spread in Tashkent about the commandant’s dissatisfaction
and the arguments he had used in order to prevent the Kazakh community from
electing a new judge. In fact, only two months later the Kazakhs petitioned the
commandant in order to complain about the incorrect and improper behaviour of
Taybek. In order to persuade him, they referred to the previous cases which had left
the city commandant dissatisfied with the biy (Tāybīknīng khilāf nizām qīlgān
janāblārīgha ma‘lūm būlgān sabablī). Consequently, they went on to ask him to
revise cases Taybek had previously closed (Tāybīkning qīlgān wa butūrgān
ishlārīn haqīqat qīlūrgha farmāyish), thus proving that their commitment was
serious, and only after this did they ask him to let them elect a new biy (biy qīlūb),
chosen among reasonable and knowledgeable individuals of their community
(‘aqllīk īsh bilādūrghān ādamlārdīn).120 The request was accepted and in July 1881,
the Kazakhs elected Yakhshibay Khudybay.121 But, as had happened before,
Yakhshibay did not stay in office for long. At the beginning of 1882, he was
anonymously accused of bribery.122
Conclusion
While Russian lawmakers may have thought of elections as a tool to undermine the
native judiciary in Central Asia, this case study has shown that their strategy proved
to be successful only with the biys, while the qadis’ positions actually became more
stable. As we noted above, in order to explain such a major difference, we have to
assume that with the establishment of colonial power, the native judiciary (both
qadis and biys) lost their former economic privileges. However, while the qadi could
charge fees solely for drawing up marriage contracts, anyone holding the position of
biy could count on quite a stable income which came from the fee he was entitled to
charge (biylik) as well as from performing other duties such as that of tax collector.
In recent years, the perils and fluctuations associated with the post of judge in
Central Asian ‘ādat-based courts have become a topic of scholarly investigation. In
this respect, it should be noted that Ol´ga Brusina, relying on the notes prepared by
Russian observers for the Girs’ commission (1880-82), has emphasized the decay
of authority among the biys, arguing that the election system allowed individuals
who were not knowledgeable about customary law to become judges.123 If we
follow this argument, we should infer that the instability suffered by the biys in
Tashkent was the direct result of their ignorance on matters regarding ‘ādat: biys
were removed because they were not qualified to hold the office they had been
119. Raport, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 6-7ob.
120. 1881nchī yilnda 19nchī māy āyinda ‘arz-nāma, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1944, l. 18.
121. Kopiia. Gospodinu nachal’niku. G. Tashkenta, TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1 d. 1944, l. 22.
122. TsGARUz, f. I-36, op. 1 d. 1944, l. 24, 27-28.
123. Brusina, “Obychnoe pravo kochevogo naseleniia Turkestana…” art. cit., 225.
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elected to. On the contrary, from the cases we have studied, it seems that the biys’
lack of knowledge and moral decay were issues which worried the Russians much
more than the Kazakhs. In fact, from the very beginning of the establishment of
Russian rule in Central Asia, colonial officers and administrators — especially
those who claimed long experience of ‘ādat-based court proceedings — were
deeply concerned about the immorality of the biys.124 Therefore, it is highly likely
that in an environment of emerging factionalism such as the tiny Kazakh milieu in
Tashkent, local groups were “instrumentalizing” arguments such as the lack of
legal knowledge, corruption, or financial misbehavior merely to influence the
Russian governors’ decisions in their favor. In fact, as the investigation of the cases
involving the biys Altybay and Taybek has shown, the charges brought against
them by their fellow Kazakhs were ultimately found to be groundless. This suggests
that such arguments were used by the Kazakhs as discursive weapons in order to
gain control of local judgeships: they voted for the person who in a given
circumstance appeared to be the most trustworthy. But as soon as the biy they had
elected ruled against them, they could always try to get rid of him by discrediting
his moral standing or else questioning his ability to judge.
In addition, the reliability of the conclusions made by Russian experts should
not be taken for granted or trusted more than the indigenous complaints. That this
may indeed be so is clear when we examine the accounts given by the local people
who were heard by the Girs’ commission. Among many other issues concerning the
native administration, the deleterious effects of holding elections were directly
discussed by aksakals, qadis, and notables from Turkestan, that is, a group which
included representatives of the Tashkent and Kurama uezds. Everybody
acknowledged that because of the elections, administrative posts were sometimes
occupied by individuals who were not suitable (nā-munāsib) to carry out the duties
involved. They could not hide that election results could depend on corruption (pul,
pāra), moral suasion (ri‘āya), and threats (ighwālār).125 Despite these problems,
they emphasized that trustworthy, qualified people were still elected. When asked
about the duties of qadis and biys, the judiciaries from both the settled and the
nomadic population strongly recommended that qadis should be allowed to
participate in elections only if given a letter of recommendation (shahādat-nāma)
by the ‘ulamā’ and the faculty of the city madrasas.126 But when they touched upon
the nomadic groups and their judiciary, the Kazakhs asked the colonial
administration that “for the sake of the Kazakh population, a biy should be elected
in every volost´ in order to decrease the number of disputes.”127 
124. See for example, N. Dingel´shtadt, “Odno iz otzhivaiushchikh uchrezhdenii,” Zhurnal
grazhdanskago i ugalovnago prava, 7 (1892): 1-23; A. Zuev, “Kirgizskii narodnyi sud,”
Zhurnal ministerstva iustitsii, 12 (1907): 161-208.
125. Cf. Sbornik otvetov, ms. Tashkent, Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences,
inv. no. 1644/II, f. 7v, 14r, 39r.
126. Ibid., f. 40r..
127. wa yana iltimās qīlāmīz qazaqiyya fuqarālārnī manfa‘atī ūchūn har bir būlūstgā īkkī
nafardan biy qīlinsa aning ūchūnki mazkūrlārnī janjāllārī kam būlūb, ibid., f. 40r..
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Although the case of the Tashkent Kazakhs is, of course, a particular one, it
furnishes relevant information on how important it was for a community to keep
alive the practice of customary law in a colonial environment which was
deliberately trying to undermine the credibility of its judiciary. What is apparent
from the examples we have provided is that, even if they were subjected to
instability and their authority was suspect in the eyes of the Russian administrators,
the biys were still deemed as essential for defining the rights and the obligations of
Tashkent’s Kazakh community. Moreover, as the position of biy was still regarded
with respect and was economically appealing, elections may have only intensified
factionalism, which had already existed in pre-colonial time, and can still be seen in
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